If I understand Roger Cohen correctly, we must send additional forces to Afghanistan in order to counter the Taliban effectively.
Were we to cede any additional ground to the latter, Al-Qaeda would swiftly occupy that space to plot against the West.
This assessment prompts a number of questions:
*when Mr. Cohen and his interlocutor British foreign secretary David Milbank speak of the Taliban, what do they mean and who are they referring to?
The Taliban do not constitute a homogenetic movement, ninety percent is a tribal, localized insurgency. Ten percent are hardcore ideologues fighting for the Taliban, according to a US intelligence official quoted in The Boston Globe.
If, therefore, they are not all pro-Al-Qaeda Islamic fanatics, would a standard counterinsurgency campaign, even if wisely and effectively conducted, be sufficient, and likely, to neutralize all of our enemies?
*The defense of the West begins in the Hindu Kush and Helmand. Would-be bombers must be kept off-balance. To believe otherwise is wishful thinking, writes Mr. Cohen.
Perhaps, but it surely does not end there.
Is Mr. Cohen advocating that we launch a global counterinsurgency to defeat Al-Qaeda where it is also present, and in more significant numbers than in Afghanistan, in Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen, not to mention Pakistan, for instance?
If this counterinsurgency is a counterterrorist strategy is vital in Afghanistan, how can it possibly be less so in the countries previously mentioned?
*a successful counterinsurgency is predicated on the emergence of a credible government able to provide security and economic development to the Afghans.
These last eight years, the presence, ever larger, of foreign troops, and billions in foreign aid have failed to foster such a government.
Why would the arrival of an extra 40,000 troops suddenly transform Mr. Karzai (the likely winner of a fraudulent election) into an effective president, and the Afghan government into an assembly of upright and efficient servants of the people?
*we shall pursue a policy of outreach to the insurgency to divide it, and pursue a political settlement that includes the disaffected Pashtuns, backbone of the insurgency.
Are both of these developments likely to occur if the number of foreign troops occupying Afghanistan (for they are increasingly being perceived as forces of occupation) actually increases?
Could it be, in fact, that it is our very presence that is fueling the insurgency, or all the localized insurgencies, and thus actually furthering the interests of the hardcore Taliban?
Is a political settlement with the Pashtuns even possible, let alone likely, as long as foreign forces occupy Afghanistan?
In essence, is our departure not a prerequisite for the emergence of such a settlement?
*what makes Mr. Cohen so sure we are even qualified to undertake an effective counterinsurgency strategy, and nation-building effort?
Judging by our performance of the last eight years, what leads him to conclude that we can succeed in both these areas now after having failed for so long?
*how would Mr. Cohen describe the notion that we can defeat the Taliban, destroy Al-Qaeda and build an effective, modern and benign Afghan state without injecting massive financial and human resources, and staying committed for at least one, if not two, generations, wishful thinking?
The Afghan project propounded by the counterinsurgency school is simply unrealistic and thus dangerous.
In all likelihood, it will end in failure because vastly over ambitious if not overweening.
Obama’s meticulous approach to the issue is long overdue: the Iraq disaster has aptly demonstrated where haste, hubris and ignorance will lead you.
Let us be humble and rely on those who know Afghanistan and intend to stay there.
Why not let the Afghans decide what is best for Afghanistan?
(the photographs of the war in Afghanistan can be found here)
Were we to cede any additional ground to the latter, Al-Qaeda would swiftly occupy that space to plot against the West.
This assessment prompts a number of questions:
*when Mr. Cohen and his interlocutor British foreign secretary David Milbank speak of the Taliban, what do they mean and who are they referring to?
The Taliban do not constitute a homogenetic movement, ninety percent is a tribal, localized insurgency. Ten percent are hardcore ideologues fighting for the Taliban, according to a US intelligence official quoted in The Boston Globe.
If, therefore, they are not all pro-Al-Qaeda Islamic fanatics, would a standard counterinsurgency campaign, even if wisely and effectively conducted, be sufficient, and likely, to neutralize all of our enemies?
*The defense of the West begins in the Hindu Kush and Helmand. Would-be bombers must be kept off-balance. To believe otherwise is wishful thinking, writes Mr. Cohen.
Perhaps, but it surely does not end there.
Is Mr. Cohen advocating that we launch a global counterinsurgency to defeat Al-Qaeda where it is also present, and in more significant numbers than in Afghanistan, in Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen, not to mention Pakistan, for instance?
If this counterinsurgency is a counterterrorist strategy is vital in Afghanistan, how can it possibly be less so in the countries previously mentioned?
*a successful counterinsurgency is predicated on the emergence of a credible government able to provide security and economic development to the Afghans.
These last eight years, the presence, ever larger, of foreign troops, and billions in foreign aid have failed to foster such a government.
Why would the arrival of an extra 40,000 troops suddenly transform Mr. Karzai (the likely winner of a fraudulent election) into an effective president, and the Afghan government into an assembly of upright and efficient servants of the people?
*we shall pursue a policy of outreach to the insurgency to divide it, and pursue a political settlement that includes the disaffected Pashtuns, backbone of the insurgency.
Are both of these developments likely to occur if the number of foreign troops occupying Afghanistan (for they are increasingly being perceived as forces of occupation) actually increases?
Could it be, in fact, that it is our very presence that is fueling the insurgency, or all the localized insurgencies, and thus actually furthering the interests of the hardcore Taliban?
Is a political settlement with the Pashtuns even possible, let alone likely, as long as foreign forces occupy Afghanistan?
In essence, is our departure not a prerequisite for the emergence of such a settlement?
*what makes Mr. Cohen so sure we are even qualified to undertake an effective counterinsurgency strategy, and nation-building effort?
Judging by our performance of the last eight years, what leads him to conclude that we can succeed in both these areas now after having failed for so long?
*how would Mr. Cohen describe the notion that we can defeat the Taliban, destroy Al-Qaeda and build an effective, modern and benign Afghan state without injecting massive financial and human resources, and staying committed for at least one, if not two, generations, wishful thinking?
The Afghan project propounded by the counterinsurgency school is simply unrealistic and thus dangerous.
In all likelihood, it will end in failure because vastly over ambitious if not overweening.
Obama’s meticulous approach to the issue is long overdue: the Iraq disaster has aptly demonstrated where haste, hubris and ignorance will lead you.
Let us be humble and rely on those who know Afghanistan and intend to stay there.
Why not let the Afghans decide what is best for Afghanistan?
(the photographs of the war in Afghanistan can be found here)
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