The Afghan issue currently being debated in Washington and European capitals should focus not so much on General McChrystal’s troop increase request, or the merits of the Biden option, that is to say, counterterrorism instead of counterinsurgency, the policy in place since 2001, and that has failed to provide any tangible results, argues Roger Cohen, the astute New York Times columnist.
Instead, it is our capacity and willingness to stay committed to the Afghan people that is at stake. Numbers matter less than endurance, details less than overall design, wrote Mr. Cohen.
But, what should that overall design be?
Rebuilding Afghanistan, economically and politically; preventing the Taliban from regaining power; dismantling the Al-Qaeda network, thereby inhibiting it from sponsoring, organizing or launching terrorist attacks against the West?
Which is it?
All three, or option number three only?
If the overriding mission, the one that led us to invade Afghanistan in the first place, is to destroy Al-Qaeda, does that really entail building a modern, efficient state, and defeating the Taliban?
Mr. Cohen suggests that we be firm with the Afghan leader, President Karzai, assuming he remains in office — must be presented with certain non-negotiable demands: better governors; officials not beholden to Narcoshire; a transparent outreach program to “small T” Taliban; strong cooperation in fast-forwarding the Afghan Army and police.
Mr. Karzai has been in power for years, and unwilling, unable or both, to deliver any progress in the critically important areas mentioned by Mr. Cohen.
Should we reasonably expect him to govern effectively and responsibly now, if he is reelected?
Debilitating the Al-Qaeda network is a mission that will be long and arduous, demand resolve, several thousand troops (mainly Special Forces) on the ground, but that, most likely, can be successfully accomplished.
Do we really have the means and the will, financial and political, to accomplish the other two requirements demanded by the proponents of the counterinsurgency option, that is to say, creating a modern and benign state, and defeating the Taliban?
This will require massive human and financial resources, and lead to substantial casualties, not only US and NATO, but also civilian Afghan casualties.
And, suppose that we had both the determination and stamina to undertake such an ambitious mission, are we even qualified to make the attempt?
McChrystal himself has emphasized the fact that US and NATO troops knew next to nothing of the culture, politics and language of the Afghans…
In light of this crass ignorance should it not be the responsibility of the Afghans to decide what Afghanistan should look like, how it should be ruled, and by whom?
The Taliban (and they are not a homogeneous group) are Afghans too, and cannot be simply dismissed as medieval fanatics and terrorists. They will not go away tomorrow, (we will), and the grievances they voice must somehow be dealt with. Needless to say, this does not mean that we should simply hand over the levers of power to Mullah Omar.
It does mean however, that some sort of accommodation must be found with this current of Afghan politics
In addition, would so many of them have taken up arms, if 100,000 mostly Christian soldiers not invaded their land?
Furthermore, what do we have to show for our eight-year presence on the ground?
If last August’s failed and fraudulent presidential election is any indication, not much…
Our military presence, incompetence, and inability to significantly improve the lives of most Afghans has alienated legions of them. Many experts in and from Afghanistan warn that our presence over the past eight years has already hardened a meaningful percentage of the population into viewing the United States as an army of occupation which should be opposed and resisted, wrote Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis, in a report on the Afghan situation.
All those who respect the Afghan people and admire their fortitude (the country has been devastated by thirty years of war) sincerely hope that one day, Afghanistan will be a prosperous, democratic country, respectful of its people and able to protect them.
But, we shall never be able to impose a western, democratic model on the Afghans.
A punitive expedition against Al-Qaeda is one thing; but to seek, against the grain of history, to rebuild Afghanistan from the ground up, in the name of a western concept of democracy and human rights, is futile.
If this madcap venture is to take 40 years, as General Sir David Richards, chief of the general staff, averred this year, no conceivable national interest can be served by such an eccentric concentration of resources on a country of marginal importance, wrote Christopher Meyer, Britain’s former ambassador in Washington.
What we can do is concentrate on eradicating the Al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
We should also do our utmost to train, and equip an effective Afghan army and police able to defend and protect the Afghan people, and that the nation will be able to afford and sustain when we are gone. It is remarkable how little we have accomplished in this area these last eight years.
Let us heed the advice of Rory Stewart, an expert on Afghanistan and a professor and director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University, focus on what we can do. We don't have a moral obligation to do what we can't, he told Lynn Sherr of PBS.
As for the rest, it is the Afghans’ responsibility, not ours…
Instead, it is our capacity and willingness to stay committed to the Afghan people that is at stake. Numbers matter less than endurance, details less than overall design, wrote Mr. Cohen.
But, what should that overall design be?
Rebuilding Afghanistan, economically and politically; preventing the Taliban from regaining power; dismantling the Al-Qaeda network, thereby inhibiting it from sponsoring, organizing or launching terrorist attacks against the West?
Which is it?
All three, or option number three only?
If the overriding mission, the one that led us to invade Afghanistan in the first place, is to destroy Al-Qaeda, does that really entail building a modern, efficient state, and defeating the Taliban?
Mr. Cohen suggests that we be firm with the Afghan leader, President Karzai, assuming he remains in office — must be presented with certain non-negotiable demands: better governors; officials not beholden to Narcoshire; a transparent outreach program to “small T” Taliban; strong cooperation in fast-forwarding the Afghan Army and police.
Mr. Karzai has been in power for years, and unwilling, unable or both, to deliver any progress in the critically important areas mentioned by Mr. Cohen.
Should we reasonably expect him to govern effectively and responsibly now, if he is reelected?
Debilitating the Al-Qaeda network is a mission that will be long and arduous, demand resolve, several thousand troops (mainly Special Forces) on the ground, but that, most likely, can be successfully accomplished.
Do we really have the means and the will, financial and political, to accomplish the other two requirements demanded by the proponents of the counterinsurgency option, that is to say, creating a modern and benign state, and defeating the Taliban?
This will require massive human and financial resources, and lead to substantial casualties, not only US and NATO, but also civilian Afghan casualties.
And, suppose that we had both the determination and stamina to undertake such an ambitious mission, are we even qualified to make the attempt?
McChrystal himself has emphasized the fact that US and NATO troops knew next to nothing of the culture, politics and language of the Afghans…
In light of this crass ignorance should it not be the responsibility of the Afghans to decide what Afghanistan should look like, how it should be ruled, and by whom?
The Taliban (and they are not a homogeneous group) are Afghans too, and cannot be simply dismissed as medieval fanatics and terrorists. They will not go away tomorrow, (we will), and the grievances they voice must somehow be dealt with. Needless to say, this does not mean that we should simply hand over the levers of power to Mullah Omar.
It does mean however, that some sort of accommodation must be found with this current of Afghan politics
In addition, would so many of them have taken up arms, if 100,000 mostly Christian soldiers not invaded their land?
Furthermore, what do we have to show for our eight-year presence on the ground?
If last August’s failed and fraudulent presidential election is any indication, not much…
Our military presence, incompetence, and inability to significantly improve the lives of most Afghans has alienated legions of them. Many experts in and from Afghanistan warn that our presence over the past eight years has already hardened a meaningful percentage of the population into viewing the United States as an army of occupation which should be opposed and resisted, wrote Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis, in a report on the Afghan situation.
All those who respect the Afghan people and admire their fortitude (the country has been devastated by thirty years of war) sincerely hope that one day, Afghanistan will be a prosperous, democratic country, respectful of its people and able to protect them.
But, we shall never be able to impose a western, democratic model on the Afghans.
A punitive expedition against Al-Qaeda is one thing; but to seek, against the grain of history, to rebuild Afghanistan from the ground up, in the name of a western concept of democracy and human rights, is futile.
If this madcap venture is to take 40 years, as General Sir David Richards, chief of the general staff, averred this year, no conceivable national interest can be served by such an eccentric concentration of resources on a country of marginal importance, wrote Christopher Meyer, Britain’s former ambassador in Washington.
What we can do is concentrate on eradicating the Al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
We should also do our utmost to train, and equip an effective Afghan army and police able to defend and protect the Afghan people, and that the nation will be able to afford and sustain when we are gone. It is remarkable how little we have accomplished in this area these last eight years.
Let us heed the advice of Rory Stewart, an expert on Afghanistan and a professor and director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University, focus on what we can do. We don't have a moral obligation to do what we can't, he told Lynn Sherr of PBS.
As for the rest, it is the Afghans’ responsibility, not ours…
(the photograph of the Taliban can be found here)
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