![](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhOrhZ4XUBok37w3C_6aMmZl37Il0lKrKx_NfUNM3ThKu4eIynSpDisr2e5iVQ41yq5B7l1CRMI3Sgab6mQwKP3Ti-Y4-VziudRBXSO3Pmc7vs2QMMP8l1-R9DSPTkOvy0Q2HFkHeoilklj/s200/Obama+and+the+general+white+house+photo.jpg)
It was a sound decision.
The US and NATO have been present in Afghanistan since 2001, and yet, the situation continues to deteriorate.
The time had come to reassess the mission, clarify its goals, and devise a strategy capable of realizing these objectives. All relevant parties would be consulted: the State Department, the National Security Council, the Pentagon, the intelligence community, NATO, and the diplomats and military leaders on the ground.
Critics on the right, however, have accused President Obama of wasting precious time.
This should not be a leisurely process, John McCain
admonished the president at a recent meeting.
But Obama is determined not to be rushed and pushed into adopting a strategy that may not be suited to the needs of the moment. Unlike his predecessor, who consulted little and relied on
instinct, Obama is wont to examine all the aspects of a particular issue before charting a course.
We should have learned as a country that you want the president to make smart, reasoned decisions based on fact and not to make rash decisions that are more about instinct, David Axelrod, a senior presidential adviser
told Reuters.
The process will take time, a
decision is not expected before several weeks, but only a painstaking review will enable the president to craft a policy actually able to produce the desired results.
When a president is dealing with such extraordinarily complex situations, it's more important that you get it right than do it fast, suggested Anthony Cordesman, of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Some critics were not convinced and scolded the president for being indecisive.
One pundit
referred to the review process as
Young Hamlet’s Agony.
No doubt some regretted the days when the Decider was in charge, and decisions were made expeditiously (many would say impetuously).
I’m a gut player, he liked to
say…
Furthermore, these same critics have also chided him for not meeting with General McChrystal, the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, more often.
During the last administration, president Bush would consult his top commander in Iraq, David Petraeus at least once a week, usually by video conference.
President Obama, on the other hand prefers to rely first and foremost on Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen and Defense Secretary Robert Gates when soliciting the opinion of the military. Many in the military establishment were pleased that Obama restored the traditional links between the White House and the military.
This commander in chief uses the chain of command. There are a lot of military leaders who very much appreciate that, one official
told the
WP.
Though General McChrystal’s recommendations have attracted much media attention, they are but one element of a broader review of the overall strategy to be adopted in Afghanistan.
It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of other elements of the strategy,
stated James Jones, the National Security Adviser.
Though the general has suggested that jettisoning an enhanced counterinsurgency policy would lead to what he
called Chaos-istan, (he made the remark in a speech in London that some characterized as
inappropriate), Jones
considers that the current situation, though serious, is not dire, and that Afghanistan is
not in imminent danger of falling into the hands of the Taliban. Furthermore, he added, alQaeda is
very diminished there,
with less than 100 (terrorists) operating in the country.
Other options, not solely McChrystal’s, and including the counterterrorism approach advocated by Vice President Biden, had to be examined.
The president should be presented with options, not just one fait accompli,
concluded Jones.
In essence, the president will not be compelled to go where he does not wish to go.
The new policy will be conditioned by the answers provided to the following fundamental questions:
*what is the ultimate objective of the mission: destroying alQaeda, defeating the Taliban, building a viable Afghan state? The first, the second, all three?
*if the paramount goal is to destroy al-Qaeda, do we need to defeat the Taliban to achieve it? Would it be sufficient to prevent them from seizing power? Does it matter?
*Do the Taliban, as such, pose a threat to the security of the US and the West?
In other words, what does winning the war mean, and, conversely, what does losing entail?
In this context, the troop increase demanded by the general is but one element of a larger, much more complex puzzle.
For those critics on the right who have suddenly rediscovered the Afghan war, after having considered it as a secondary endeavor for the better part of the last eight years, when they did not actually ignore it altogether, the Obama review is superfluous since a strategy for victory has already been proposed by General McChrystal. The counterinsurgency strategy, that is to say,
a surge of 30,000 to 40,000 troops to stabilize a downward spiral and save Afghanistan the way a similar surge saved Iraq, to quote one observer who writes a weekly
column in the
WP is certain to succeed if Obama provides the necessary resources.
These Washington strategists have discovered the solution, the ultimate panacea for the Afghan quandary: the surge!
It worked in Iraq, they claim,why should it not do wonders in Afghanistan, all the more so,
as the world's foremost expert on counterinsurgency (he saved Iraq with it), David Petraeus (to
quote Charles Krauthammer) supports the plan?
For one thing, and assuming Iraq is
saved, it was not the surge as such that led to a lessening of violence in Iraq, but a combination of factors. An increase in manpower would not have sufficed.
The Sunni tribes of Iraq, by and large, alienated by the brutal methods of the Islamic insurgents, seeking a modus vivendi with the US occupation forces, were financially enticed by the US military to switch sides and support its efforts in the country. Thus, thousands joined the Sunni Awakening movement, depriving the anti-American insurgency of efficient and lethal combatants.
Simultaneously, yet equally significant, the Mahdi Army, a Shiite
militia created by Muqtada al-Sadr to defend the Shiite community, decided to call a truce at the instigation of its leader, therby preventing the country from sliding into an all out civil war.
It was the combination of these three factors that allowed the situation in Iraq to stabilize somewhat, giving the Iraqi government (elected by the people) some breathing space to try and restore some order and basic public services.
The situation in Afghanistan is vastly different.
There are no functioning institutions to speak of. As McChrystal himself
wrote in his report,
the weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government. ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, is the official name of the US-NATO dominated mission.
The recent presidential elections held in August (the official results of which have still not been announced) and that were supposed to allow the Afghan people to freely choose their new leader were characterized by widespread
fraud.
In Helmand province for instance, 38,000 people voted, according to the United Nations. Yet, 134,804 votes were tallied, 112,873 of them for president Karzai.
In Kandahar province, some 100,000 voters went to the polls.Yet, Karzai won 221,436 of the 252,886 registered votes.
The list goes on…
The election further discredited the very notion of democracy, and the victor, when he is finally designated, perhaps after a second round runoff, will lack all legitimacy.
In Iraq, a credible government was in place.
In Kabul, how will the West be able to work effectively with such a weakened leader?
A counterinsurgency strategy can only work if you have a credible and legitimate Afghan partner. That’s in doubt now. Part of the reason you are seeing a hesitancy to jump deeper into the pool is that they are looking to see if they can make lemonade out of the lemons we got from the Afghan election, Bruce Riedel, who led the Afghanistan-Pakistan policy review in the early days of the Obama administration,
told the
NYT.
Secondly, the enemy is determined as ever to rid all of Afghanistan of foreign forces. In a message released on Thursday, the Taliban
declared if you want to turn the country of the proud and pious Afghans into a colony, then know that we have an unwavering determination and have braced for a prolonged war.
Thirdly, no significant Taliban forces have rallied to the Karzai government side…
As such, would 40,000 troops make a decisive difference?
Some in the US military establishment estimate that for the counterinsurgency plan to succeed,
600,000 soldiers and policemen will be needed.
By 2012, the Afghan army (we hope) will consist of 240,000 soldiers, and 160,000 policemen should be available (currently the numbers are 92,000 and 14,000 respectively),
according to Carl Levin (D-Michigan), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. That leaves 200,000 that the US and NATO will have to provide…Currently, there are 67,700 troops in
ISAF, with the US contributing almost 32,000. An additional
21,000 that Obama promised to send earlier this year should arrive in the fall. Even if McChrystal obtains his 40,000 troop request, the total force is still some 70,000 soldiers short. NATO members are unlikely to
increase their participation, as the war is more and more unpopular in Europe.
As such, is McChrystal’s request the first of many others to come?
The general’s request included three main options, according to people briefed on its contents. Most officials have focused on his request for 40,000 troops to avoid failure in Afghanistan, but some of them confirmed Friday an ABC News report that his maximum request outlined a troop buildup that was substantially larger than that.
The Wall Street Journal reported that one of his options called for more than 60,000 additional troops, but several officials said the maximum variant was even larger,
wrote Peter Baker in the
NYT.
If Obama decides to implement McChrystal’s plan, incremental force increases are thus inevitable. The Vietnam scenario comes to the mind of many, here. McChrystal’s initial request is relatively low, so as not to alienate his superiors in Washington who, already under pressure from anti-war democrats and the US public whose support for the war is waning, would find a more significant increase politically unpalatable.
McChrystal argues that he needs the additional forces not to kill more enemy forces, but to protect the civilian population, the basis of any counterinsurgency policy.
US forces must abandon their armored vehicles and fortified bases, and live among the people.
ISAF personnel must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army. Key personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages, the general
wrote.
McChrystal is also quite conscious that the fact that Western troops know next to nothing about Afghan society and culture inhibits their ability to counter the Taliban effectively.
Only by understanding Afghan needs and aspirations, and addressing their grievances will they make any progress in their struggle against the Taliban.
Yet, how long will it take before we are in a position to achieve this?
General John Nicholson, a specialist in the field,
told CBS that, on average, a successful counterinsurgency campaign lasts fourteen years. As far as he is concerned, we are not in the eighth year of the process, but in the
early stages.
Nothing, it seems, has been accomplished since 2001!
As one officer
told the NYT,
we haven’t been fighting in Afghanistan for eight years. We’ve been fighting in Afghanistan for one year, eight times in a row.
In such a context, how much longer will Western public opinions tolerate the presence of their forces in Afghanistan?
How much longer will the Afghan people countenance foreign forces on their soil?
It is most likely too late to engage in nation building, assuming we ever had the ability and the means to do so.
Rory Stewart, a professor and director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University
told PBS,
Afghanistan is very poor, very fragile, very traumatized. To rebuild a country like that would take 30 or 40 years of patient, tolerant investment, and probably that's what we should be aiming for. But in order to do that, we need to have a presence there which is affordable, which is quite small, which is realistic, and which the American people will endorse, and more importantly, that the Afghans will accept.
Only the Afghan government, with the support of its people, can rebuild the Afghan state.
The Afghan government needs to convince these people that they have a long term future in working with the government in Kabul. It's not something that foreign troops can do, Stewart said.
Unless you understand what a frankly low base that country's starting from — a country where 60 percent of civil servants don't have a high school education, where maybe 40 percent of the population can't read and write, where maybe a quarter of teachers are illiterate. Unless you get that, you don't get why you can't build that amazing thing that you're trying to build, he
added.
We must be realistic about what we can accomplish there.
Stewart’s advice?
Focus on what we can do. We don't have a moral obligation to do what we can't…
What can we do?
The last eight years have cruelly demonstrated that pacifying Afghanistan, rebuilding the state and its institutions, defeating the Taliban in order to defeat alQaeda was overly ambitious.
The election fiasco has only underscored this point.
We put a strategy in place, clarified our goals, but what the election has shown, as well as changing circumstances in Pakistan, is that this is going to be a very difficult operation. We’ve got to make sure that we’re constantly refining it to keep our focus on what our primary goals are, Obama
said on
CNN last Sunday.
What is the mission?
Last spring, Obama had
defined the mission’s objective as
making sure that al Qaeda cannot attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests and our allies. That's our number one priority.
The mission also had a humanitarian dimension: prevent the return of the Taliban, for that would lead to
brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights, the president
said then. ISAF failed to accomplish this aspect of the mission, these last eight years. If it was not able to conduct a sustained and effective counterinsurgency campaign, it was more successful in the counterterrorism domain.
Vice President Biden thinks that the US should concentrate on counterterrorism. A smaller, not larger force would focus on destroying the alQaeda network, where its leadership resides, using drones and special forces, not on fighting the Taliban.
According to the vice president, we must shift our focus and resources.
Today, we
spend $30 in Afghanistan for every $1 spent in Pakistan, even though alQaeda prospers in the latter country. Obama seems to be heading in this direction…
Eradicating al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and Pakistan is the fundamental mission, not the Afghan war against the Taliban as such, which does not constitute a homogeneous force, thus a homogeneous threat. We will support and assist the Afghan army, who will take the lead in fighting the Taliban.
Though, as one senior official told
The Times of London, Obama will
not tolerate their return to power, he is prepared to accept some Taliban participation in the politics of the Afghan nation.
As for the Taliban they have astutely joined the discussion, and released a
statement emphasizing that their interests are purely local in nature, and thus differ from those of alQaeda,
we did not have any agenda to harm other countries, including Europe, nor do we have such agenda today.
Should we believe this?
There is evidence to support that conclusion.
After all, the presence of alQaeda in Afghanistan led to the overthrow of the Taliban government. Would they be so hospitable a second time, should they return to power?
Given the Taliban’s limited interest in issues outside the "AfPak" region, if they came to power again now, they would be highly unlikely to host provocative terrorist groups whose actions could lead to another outside intervention,
wrote John Mueller, professor of Political Science at Ohio State University.
And even if al Qaeda were able to relocate to Afghanistan after a Taliban victory there, it would still have to operate under the same siege situation it presently enjoys in what Obama calls its "safe haven" in Pakistan.
In essence, those who consider Taliban and alQaeda to be synonymous are making a serious mistake.
The emphasis, it, seems, will now be on destroying alQaeda, and Obama is prepared to provide the resources to meet that objective, and no other.
The McChrystal surge, much to the chagrin of his many vociferous supporters, now seems out of the question…
The proposal came too late, eight years too late…
(the photograph of President Obama and General McChrystal was released by the White House)