Is the Green protest movement dead?

Is the Green protest movement dead?
The repression has been brutal, but most effective. Large pro-Mousavi demonstrations, for the most part, no longer take place. Protestors have been intimidated, threatened with mohareb, that is to say, execution for waging war on God, and beaten into submission.
But the regime has not stopped there. Anyone remotely connected to the opposition, or the demonstrators has been arrested, further undermining the movement.
We heard some news about people who are arrested at night and we are worried if it could happen to us, one Tehran resident told AP.
According to the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, more than 230 people have been arrested since the election.
Mousavi’s newspaper, The Green Word, has been shut down, and practically its entire staff arrested.
Seventy professors who had met with Mousavi were also detained for questioning. Associates of former reformist president Khatami have suffered the same fate.
Ebrahim Yazdi, a former aide of Ayatollah Khomeini, told AP:
the people that they have arrested represent a wide spectrum of the political orientation. It is much broader than in the past.
The regime is clearly intent on crushing the movement now, in order to preserve the conservative ruling clique’s monopoly on power.
This wave of arrests has had a chilling effect on all Iranians, and, particulary, on Mousavi supporters: it causes mass paranoia that nowhere's safe; you can't be in your home, you can't be in the hospital. It's much easier to arrest people at night than crack heads in the daylight. There's no camera, there's no proof, there's no pictures, said Afshon Ostovar, a Doctoral student at the University of Michigan, who is writing a dissertation on Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.
Night raids on the homes of Iranians have two additional objectives.
One is to prevent protestors from taking to the roof tops every evening at 10pm to shout God is Great, Death to the Dictator, and other similar slogans, one of the few remaining forms of protest left to those who do not accept the status quo.
The evening ritual dates back to 1979, when opponents of the Shah resorted to it as a form of protest against his brutal and oppressive regime…
There are many things happening that aren't being reported [in the media]. In every neighborhood of Tehran, people are talking about how the Basijis and other security services are coming into their houses and are terrorizing people for shouting ‘AllahuAkbar' from the rooftops, and for congregating, one resident told Human Rights Watch. Private homes are also attacked when the paramilitaries, the Basijis, suspect that they may be harboring fleeing demonstrators.
Secondly, the security forces are determined to eliminate as many satellite dishes as possible, in order to prevent Iranians from tuning in to foreign TV channels (and, in particular, to the BBC’s Persian Television Service ), and thus having access to independent news reports…
The protestors are thus under siege, and have few avenues left to express their outrage over the election results, and the behavior of their leaders.
Mousavi himself is under surveillance, and many of his aides have been arrested.
As such, the beleaguered protest movement is without leadership.
Mousavi (who told reporters I won’t give up. There is no way back) has rather cleverly managed to use the restrictions placed on demonstrations by the regime to his own advantage.
Yesterday, a demonstration ostensibly organized to commemorate the death on June 28th, 1981, of one of the leaders of the 1979 revolution, Mohammad Beheshti, was authorized, and Mousavi supporters, all dressed in black in order to mourn the seventeen protestors who, so far, have been killed by the security forces, took to the streets, shouting God is Great, raising their arms, and making the V victory sign:
there was a sea of people and the crowd stretched a long way onto the main street on Shariati, one witness told the NYT.
The demonstration, predictably, was brutally broken up by the police….
Incidentally, families seeking to retrieve the bodies of their loved ones killed by the security forces are charged a bullet fee (the ones used to kill the hapless victim) of $3000...
It is now clear to Mousavi and his supporters that victory will not come from the streets.
And yet, the Ahmadinejad-Khamenei party has not succeeded in rallying all the regime’s heavyweights to its cause.
The political elite is divided and the hopes of many Mousavi supporters now rest on Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, who supported Mousavi during the campaign, and heads the Assembly of Experts. The assembly is designed to select the Supreme Leader, and monitor his performance. Currently, he is reportedly trying to have the Supreme Leader function replaced by a leadership committee consisting in two or three members, one of which would be Khamenei.
One Iranian analyst told The Observer’s Peter Beaumont: although Hashemi Rafsanjani is not a popular politician in Iran any more, he is the only hope that Iranians have ... for the annulment of the election. He is the only one who people think is able to stand against the supreme leader.
But the assembly is divided between Rafsanjani supporters, and those of Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, a hardline cleric, and mentor of Ahmadinejad.
It is by no means assured, therefore, that Rafsanjani will prevail.
Indeed, the Expediency Council (a body that advises the Supreme Leader and oversees all branches of the government), also headed by Rafsanjani, confirmed the election results, since they had been approved by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has the last word on issues of import.
Another powerful faction, however, led by, among others, Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, mayor of Tehran, and former officer in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and Ali Larijani, a rival of Ahmadinejad, and currently the Speaker of Parliament, have ostensibly failed to back the President. What, in the end, will this faction do?
it’s an odd dynamic. The person they have to be loyal to, the supreme leader, has thrown his weight behind this person they despise. Ghalibaf is one of these people, like Larijani, and others had been on the fence, and if there is a tipping point they could go the other way, Karim Sadjadpour, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told the NYT…
In essence, the power struggle has not been resolved, and thus continues, no longer in the streets, however, but behind closed doors…
Is there any hope?
More and more Iranians seem to think that there no longer is any.
One hairdresser told Nazila Fathi, of the NYT:
people are depressed, and they feel they have been lied to, robbed of their rights and now are being insulted. It is not just a lie; it’s a huge one. And it doesn’t end.
　
　
　
　
　
　
　
　
　

Things will never be the same

For the first time since 1875, a French president delivered a speech to both houses of parliament in Versailles yesterday.
At Sarkozy’s request, parliament had recently amended the constitution which previously prohibited presidents from doing so, a manifestation of the separation of powers.
Before the amendment was passed, presidential messages and speeches were read aloud by the presidents of both houses, the National Assembly, and the Senate, as the parliamentarians solemnly remained standing during the address.
Two years after being elected, and after a convincing election victory earlier this month in the European Parliamentary elections (and in which he trounced his principle rivals), Sarkozy was keen to set out his priorities for the next phase of his mandate, as the world economy is still adversely affected by last year’s financial and economic crisis.
What conclusions does he draw from the crisis?
Things will never be the same.
The crisis is a major one, but it can also be an opportunity to renew and rejuvenate the nation.
The post Cold-War economic model, characterized by deregulation in the financial industries, is dead. The ensuing economic crisis has engendered a strong need for regulation, justice and protection from its harsh consequences. As such, he does not believe that, after the recession, it will be business as usual, for mentalities have evolved..
According to Sarkozy, there are two types of globalization:
*one favoring external growth: rabid competition entailing low prices, and thus low wages at home;
*the other, internal growth: by producing and consuming more, we all contribute to the general prosperity of the nation.
The challenge is to redirect globalization from the external growth model to the internal growth one.
He believes that the economic meltdown will make that transformation possible, as the Anglo-Saxon model based on deregulation, high levels of debt, and speculation has visibly failed us all, and been discredited for doing so.
In addition, this shift in public perception should render the French model more palatable. The ambition of this model, according to Sarkozy, is to conciliate human, social and economic progress.
That is an ambitious project indeed…
To succeed, the French economic model must be competitive, and its productivity equal to none. That can be assured only by quality education, health and social services, research and development, infrastructure, and quality of life.
Sarkozy’s aim is to mobilize all human and material resources to achieve the goal of improving the fundamental components of the French model, which entails close cooperation between the private and public sectors.
France’s approach to fostering economic development and prosperity is different form America or Britain’s.
Yet, the failure of the latter (financial capitalism) model has, in many ways, helped rehabilitate the French model:
The post-crisis world will be one in which France’s message shall be better received and understood, Sarkozy said in his speech.
France’s ambition, he added, it to place the economy at the service of human beings, and not vice versa.
In order to do that, we must revert back to the basics: work, entrepreneurship, creation, production, values jettisoned, according to Sarkozy, by the proponents of the now collapsed Wall Street model of growth through debt, speculation, and the creative, but hazardous use of complex and toxic financial instruments.
In the new world that is about to dawn, he said, our engineers, artists, our unique conception of public services, our long-held ability to cultivate private and public sector cooperation will once again become considerable advantages.
Yet, Sarkozy recognizes that the tasks at hand are enormous.
For, since the Trente Glorieuses (the thirty years of uninterrupted growth and modernization that spanned the 1944-1974 period, post-war to first oil shock), France’s economic performance and efficiency have been anemic.
The French model may now be less often casually dismissed in foreign economic circles because of its unique ability to protect its population from the most acute effects of a global economic meltdown (this also explains why the French stimulus package was less significant, proportionally, than America’s, for social and economic safeguards are integral elements of the system), it nevertheless needs to be modernized.
Structural unemployment is one major weakness, and is much higher than in comparable economies. Youth unemployment has similarly always been very high, while the employment of seniors very low!
How the nation treats its underprivileged and its minorities is also an urgent and major challenge.
Equality is a term in the French Republic’s official motto, but egalitarianism is not.
Though we must ensure that true equal opportunity does exist for all, that does not mean everyone must be treated equally, but, rather, according to one‘s just deserts, the president insisted…
France’s attempts to socially integrate foreign minorities are also failing.
Hence, Sarkozy once again promoted his affirmative action plan (called discrimination positive in French), in order to give more to those who have less, in the president’s words.
The scheme will be based on social, and not ethnic criteria.
On a corollary issue, he also used the speech to comment on a discussion that has dominated French media of late, concerning the wearing of the burqa (the ponderous, full-length cloak worn by women in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan) by some in France’s inner cities.
For Sarkozy, this is not a religious freedom issue, but one of human rights and dignity.
It is not a religious symbol, but one of enslavement, and debasement, the president claimed.
Parliament is to grapple with the issue, and a law barring the wearing of the apparel may be forthcoming…
On the budgetary front, France’s management of public finances has been particularly inefficient the last thirty years, and Sarkozy fully intends to address the issue.
He has refused, however, to significantly cut costs and trim the state budget in order to tame ever-growing deficits. He considers that the nation needs more investment in the economy, not less.
Nor will he increase the level of taxation, already inordinately high in France.
Public spending will simply have to be used more intelligently: the central question is the quality of public spending, he asserted.
In a nutshell, here are the priorities Sarkozy considers vital for the state to finance:
*ensuring no one falls through the cracks of the social safety nets;
*scholarships for gifted but needy students;
*vocational training for all those between 16 and 18 who are no longer in school;
*enabling all those who have lost their job to retain their salary for a year while they
undergo training in order to find work in a sector where it is available;
*investment in green technologies;
*investment in higher education (high schools and universities).
In essence, his strategy is to help and support all those who, in France, one way or another, create, and create wealth, the goal being increasing the number of those actively contributing to national prosperity.
Conversely, in order to cut costs, he will streamline the state (only one retiring civil servant out of two will be replaced), as well as the state’s cumbersome administrative structure.
French social programs will also be revamped, if they are not to go bankrupt. Hence, the retirement scheme will need reform, and the legal retirement age, now at 60, will most likely have to be extended.
If the unions cannot agree on a program to fix these issues, such as the level of payments and pensions, then Sarkozy will act, in mid-2010, if need be.
Yet, Sarkozy is ready to launch a discussion on what the nation’s priorities should be, which he plans to finance by issuing a public loan in the Fall.
Parliament will be consulted, as will the leading players in the economic, scientific, academic and artistic communities.
For the next three months, we shall discuss these issues together. Decisions will be made once the national debate has been held. What I am requesting is a revolution in our ways of thinking, the president said, a radical change in our relation to the future.
Sarkozy, practically mid-way through his mandate, is determined to act quickly and boldly: you will have understood that what I am proposing is action. Let us have the courage to change.
It remains to be seen whether he shall be heard. Resistance to change is endemic in France, and militantly conservative activists entrenched in every nook and cranny of the state and the economy…
He may just yet, however, have the necessary determination to make some changes for the better…

(the photograph on top is by Benoit Tessier/AP)
　
　

The day that Neda died

The young woman was even deprived of a funeral ceremony by the authorities.
In fact, every mosque in Tehran was instructed not to organize any event in honor of Neda Soltani who was gunned down last Saturday during a demonstration in the capital.
Her fiancé, Kaspin Makan, described her last moments in an interview with BBC Persian TV:
She had been sitting with her music teacher in a car, stuck in traffic, when she decided to get out because of the heat. “She got out of the car for just for a few minutes [and] that’s when she was shot dead,” he said.
Mr Makan quoted eyewitnesses as saying she appeared to have been targeted deliberately by “paramilitaries in civilian clothing.”
He added that officials had prevented mourners holding a memorial service at a mosque on Monday. “The authorities are aware that everybody in Iran and throughout the whole world knows about her story, they were afraid that lots of people could turn up.”
The regime clearly fears that a public funeral would exacerbate the situation, and strengthen the demonstrators.
Thanks to the internet, and YouTube, Neda, in just two days, has become the symbol, the face of the protest movement.
A funeral ceremony could have easily attracted vast crowds.
The authorities are currently attempting, and with some success, to dissuade Iranians from marching in the streets to challenge the election results, and thus the regime itself, all the more so as martyrs, victims of violence and oppression, play a pivotal role in Shiism.
At its heart is the death of Hussein, a grandson of the Prophet, who, along with his brother Abbas, led a revolt against the corrupt and repressive regime of the Caliph. Both were killed in battle by the latter’s forces, led by Yazid, and are buried under the Golden Dome, in Karbala, Iraq. The anniversary of his death, Ashura, is a day of mourning for all Shiites.
According to Shiite ritual, mourning the fallen occurs three, seven and forty days after their death. These commemorations, if they are able to take place, and lead to even more violence and deaths could severely undermine the regime.
This same cycle of demonstrations, deaths, and mourning occurred thirty years ago, and eventually lead to the overthrow of the Shah.
As such, the authorities are intent on clearing the streets, and preventing further marches. Today, the Revolutionary Guards, a powerful militia whose role is to protect and defend the regime, issued a stern warning to any potential troublemakers. Those who chose to march should be prepared for a resolution and revolutionary confrontation with the Guards, Basij and other security forces and disciplinary forces.
As a result, the demonstrations are drawing smaller crowds.
Today, only several hundred protestors gathered in central Tehran.
They were met with tear gas and assaulted by the police…
Yet, Mirhossein Mousavi, who has accused the regime of rigging the presidential ballot, refused to back down. Though the authorities are directly blaming him for the violence and deaths, he, in fact, is holding the government’s illegal actions responsible for the current chaos: shooting at the people, militarizing the city, scaring the people, provoking them, and displaying power are all the result of the unlawfulness we're witnessing today.
For his part, he claims that the law is on his side :protesting to lies and fraud is your right, only if it is done peacefully. Hence, did he ask his followers to avoid violence in your protest .
Yet, the regime is increasing the pressure, not only on the demonstrators, but also on Mousavi himself, to make him think twice about persevering in his quest to have the election annulled. Ali Shahrokhi, head of the Iranian parliament’s judiciary committee said:
Moussavi’s calling for illegal protests and issuing provocative statements have been a source of recent unrests in Iran. Such criminal acts should be confronted firmly.
It is conceivable that the regime will not hesitate to arrest and prosecute him if he does not relent.

The price of resistance is steadily rising. At best, it is assault and arrest, but as Neda's tragic fate demonstrates, human life has become a cheap commodity on the streets of Tehran.

We can only make one wish: that Neda and all the other victims, the anonymous ones, did not die for nothing, and that those holding the guns, and those directing them shall rue the day that Neda died...

"I had waited thirty years for this"

The authorities, and the Supreme Leader himself in his sermon on Friday, had warned the people that anyone found demonstrating in the streets would be harshly dealt with, and bear responsibility for whatever ensued.
Yet, many Iranians were not cowed by the regime’s stern admonitions, and marched in the streets anyway, even if it meant risking assault and arrest.
The government clearly intended to use the security forces to end, brutally if necessary, the near-daily demonstrations , which it considers an affront to the dignity and authority of the regime, and a potential threat to its viability…
Does the Supreme Leader still command the respect of the people, for thousands simply ignored his injunctions. Their confidence in the regime and its ability or willingness to adequately accommodate their demands is clearly shaken.
The demonstrators attempted to reach Enghlab Square and march to Azadi Square, but the streets to the former were blocked by police both on foot and on motorcycles…
The crowds were much smaller than in preceding days because the regime had clearly stated its intentions to resort to violence…
Some three thousand summoned the courage to march peacefully, and confront the security forces, if need be.
As one protestor told The Guardian:
We were very determined but scared. That is how I can describe the most people who came out to attend the demonstration today. After the fierce speech at the Friday prayers, we knew that today we would be treated differently. We felt so vulnerable, more than ever, but at the same time were aware of our power, which, no matter how influential it is collectively, would have done little to protect us today. We could only take our bones and flesh to the streets and expose them to batons and bullets.
And expose them they did….The demonstrators faced police and paramilitaries with tear gas, water canons and truncheons.
Yet, some police officers seemed to have qualms about inflicting violence on their fellow citizens. Roger Cohen, of the New York Times, heard one police commander shout to demonstrators:
I swear to God, I have children, I have a wife, I don’t want to beat people. Please go home.
As the streets were blocked, the demonstrators sought to head towards Azadi, but were prevented form doing so as well…
But this time, they stood their ground, and the security forces charged:
The streets to Azadi are blocked. But this time, people don't change their path. They fight for it. There's a shower of stones. Tear gas. Fire…People are shouting, 'Down with the dictator'.
Shouts of Down with Khamenei were also heard…
Scores of demonstrators were injured (50 to 60?) yesterday afternoon, and 13 people were killed…
Will the violent suppression of Saturday's march be sufficient to intimidate the protestors and incite them to stop their demonstrations?
That is by no means clear.
One demonstrator told the New York Times:
If they open fire on people and if there is bloodshed, people will get angrier. They are out of their minds if they think with bloodshed they can crush the movement.
The showdown does have potentially dire implications for the regime since its paramount leader ,Ali Khamenei, has decided to take sides, and back the declared winner of the election, one many Iranians believe was rigged. By praising the election and its outcome, Khamenei has transformed himself into an accessory to the crime of betraying the people, who believed in the election and ,therefore, in the system itself…
Khamanei’s stance undermines the very regime he embodies and leads…
What moral authority can he and the nominal president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad still command, as they all head towards the endgame?
For, Mousavi has refused to back down, and accept either the validity or the legitimacy of the election. In a statement on his website Saturday, he wrote:
don't allow lies and cheaters to steal the flag of defending the Islamic system from you.
He seems determined to pursue his strategy of peaceful demonstrations, wherever it may lead, adding that he was ready for martyrdom.
Until the next demonstration, Mousavi supporters will have further opportunities to voice their support and anger, together.
Every evening, at 10pm sharp, the cries rise into the darkness:
Allahu akbar ("God is great");
Marg bar dictator ("Death to the dictator"), just like they did thirty years ago, just before the overthrow of the Shah (here it is, captured on video by the BBC).
One side demands order, the other respect, of its will, as expressed in the ballot box.
Neither seems ready for compromise on its core demands.
As such, can there be any other outcome but repression or revolution, for some Iranians appear absolutely determined to prevail, in the struggle against the Mullah autocracy:
It's no longer about Mousavi or election results, a woman who demonstrated last night, and they were numerous, said. We have suffered for thirty years. We didn't live a life. I had waited thirty years for this. Now I feel relieved, and, perhaps, at last, alive…

Power cannot be shared

Can a balance ever be found (see Roger Cohen‘s My Name Is Iran)?
Either the will of God is paramount, and elections do not matter, or they do, and the clerics must return to their seminaries and holy books.
In essence, is such a system, a theocracy where people vote, even viable?
Can there be two distinct sources of legitimacy in any polity?
The regime always lacked coherence. If the clerics who rule the nation are divinely inspired, then their legitimacy is derived from their status as God’s representatives on Earth. To question it is to commit both blasphemy and treason.
To inject electoral politics in a theocracy is to create, inevitably, another center of legitimate power, based on popular consent.
The regime believed that there would never be any antagonisms between the two centers, since the clerics would dominate both.
If and when conflicts did arise, the theocrats had the final say: the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council would see to that., as former President Mohammad Khatami’s two mandates aptly demonstrate.
No attempts to loosen the clergy’s tight grip on power were ever tolerated.
Elections were superfluous, except in the sense that they gave a veneer of legitimacy to an authoritarian system, and also provided a valuable safety valve:
Candidates (albeit vetted by the Guardian Council to ensure that only the orthodox could participate) campaigned, and the people did have a choice, however limited.
It did not matter who won, because power resided, not in the Iranian White House, but in the unelected Supreme Leader’s palace…
What happened this time?
Why did they not allow another Khatami, this time called Mousavi, to preside over a nation that they dominate?
That is the real question, and I suggest the following answer:
They lost control of the pseudo-democratic process. Once the people are allowed to participate, no matter how limited their choices may be; once they are able, and even encouraged, to participate in an election campaign; allowed to express themselves; attend rallies, then the entire process become theirs. Green Waves develop, and no one knows exactly where they will break. A chilling prospect indeed for the autocrats who have no intention of relinquishing what they consider is theirs by divine right.
The election was not about the diffident and unassuming Mousavi.
He is no longer just a 67-year-old former prime minister, the consummate insider who was close to the founder of the regime, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei, and who came out of retirement to challenge the incumbent, embarrassed by his confrontational style and philistinism.
The magic of electoral politics has transformed him into a symbol of change.
He is the repository of the hopes and dreams of a generation that longs to connect with the outside world, and that was not even born when the Shah was overthrown, and has known no other regime but the theocrats’.
The last few days of massive demonstrations have clearly demonstrated that they are not ready to give up their vision of a modern, democratic Iran.
Can the Islamic Republic of Iran survive in its present format?
It is unlikely, for power cannot be shared. Either the Mullahs will muster the will and ruthlessness to conserve it whatever the cost, or the Iranians will take what is rightfully theirs.
Who will prevail?
Those who hold the guns always have an edge…

"I wrote Mousavi, you read Ahmadinejad"

On Monday, Mirhossein Mousavi’s supporters descended on Enghelab (Revolution) Square, and marched for several hours to Azadi (Freedom) Square (see here and here for pictures of the events).
How many were they?
Though it is always difficult to tell, most observers believe that some 500,000 Iranians demonstrated in the streets that evening, transforming the event into the most significant anti-government protest since 1979...
And perhaps it is the vivid memory of those events, which led to the fall of the Shah, and the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran, that is making the current regime’s leaders so uncomfortable…
For, the route of last Monday’s march was the same followed by those activists thirty years ago (and who are now in power), as were many of the slogans: «Death to the dictator» and «Allah Akbar».
That is why the regime had declared all demonstrations illegal, and sent its paramilitary forces into the streets.
Even before the election, on June 10th, the authorities had unequivocally warned Mousavi supporters that attempts to intimidate and bully the regime would not be tolerated.
Yadollah Javani, head of the political office of the IRGC (the Guardians of the Revolution, a paramilitary group, and a pillar of the regime) had said:
The presence of supporters of Mirhossein Mousavi on the streets are part of the velvet revolution…Any kind of velvet revolution will not be successful in Iran.
But the people came any way, and demonstrate they did, some clad in green, the color of Mousavi’s campaign, others with placards that read, «I’ll fight, I’ll die but I’ll get my vote back», «Where is my vote?», among others…
Although peaceful, the demonstration ended violently however, as some protestors set fire to a building housing the Basij militia (a paramilitary group of volunteers, the regime’s ideological watchdog).
Militiamen with Kalashnikovs fired on the crowd, and seven people were killed…
Official media blamed the deaths on thugs, that is to say, the demonstrators.
They filled the streets again on Tuesday, though they were less numerous.
The regime, provocatively, had called all Ahmadinejad supporters to demonstrate as well, in the same area, but an hour earlier than the scheduled Mousavi event.
As such, Mousavi urged his supporters to stay home, but thousands failed to heed his call…
There are few television images of yesterday’s demonstration (only the Ahmadinejad march was covered by the official media) for the regime has banned all foreign coverage of the events in Iran. Foreign journalists are to remain in their offices and rely exclusively on official news outlets for information..
As their visas will not be renewed, they shall soon be compelled to leave the country.
With cell phone services and text messaging still blocked by the authorities, pro-Mousavi Iranians are extensively relying on Twitter to exchange information with each other, and communicate with the rest of the world.
As such, the Stare Department in Washington officially asked Twitter not to proceed with previously scheduled maintenance on Tuesday, so as not to penalize those Iranians resisting the regime (the company readily complied)!
With foreign media soon gone, and Iranian journalists forced to remain silent or relay official propaganda, the only source of independent news will be the Iranians themselves. In fact, amateur journalists are already sending material to established media outlets. A BBC World News editor, Jon Williams, told the New York Times:
We’ve been struck by the amount of video and eyewitness testimony. The days when regimes can control the flow of information are over.
This may indeed become the first major news story covered solely by its active participants.
The election and post-election events clearly demonstrate that the regime feels vulnerable and under threat.
Confronted by a coalition led by Mousavi, a pragmatist insider; Mohammad Khatami, a moderate, who was President of Iran between 1997 and 2005, and Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, a pillar of the Islamic republic since 1979, also a pragmatist, and former President (he was defeated in the second and final round by Ahmadinejad in 2005), the Supreme Leader Khamenei chose to support the incumbent, the candidate most likely to promote the interests of the regime..
Khamenei and his supporters (consisting first and foremost of the security forces) fear that a moderate government, with a pragmatic and less confrontational approach to international affairs would undermine the ideological underpinnings of the regime, and thus threaten its very existence. Any rapprochement with the West, and particularly the US, its arch enemy, the Great Satan, would be a betrayal of the regime, founded on the repudiation of the Western world, considered decadent and morally bankrupt.
Colluding with the West would inevitably lead to the development of social, political and economic exchanges, thus corrupting Iran’s society, culture and mores.
Confrontation is thus the only way to preserve the moral purity of the regime and of the nation.
In fact, greater freedoms would no doubt lead Iranians to question the legitimacy of the autocratic, clerical regime.
Faced with this unacceptable challenge, Khamenei threw his lot with Ahmadinejad, and abetted the conspiracy to rig the election.
This event, in the short history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is unprecedented.
According to Gary Sick, a former National Security Council official, and now at Columbia University, the willingness of the regime simply to ignore reality and fabricate election results without the slightest effort to conceal the fraud represents a historic shift in Iran's Islamic revolution. All previous leaders at least paid lip service to the voice of the Iranian people. This suggests that Iran's leaders are aware of the fact that they have lost credibility in the eyes of many (most?) of their countrymen, so they are dispensing with even the pretense of popular legitimacy in favor of raw power.
Unlike the last time that a moderate was elected (President Khatami in 1997, and 2001), it seems that the fundamentalists no longer considered that they had sufficient influence and power to successfully neutralize the moderates, supported by millions of ardent activists, the Green Wave, even if they are in control of the security apparatus.
They decided they could not accept the risks involved in such a political confrontation.
A coup may have been the sole solution.
A young Iranian journalist from Tehran explained the following to Radio Free Europe:
Coup means that right now they're beating people in the streets. A coup means they didn't even count people's votes. They announced the results without opening the ballot boxes. It was sent as a circular to the state television, which announced it. Is it so difficult for the world to understand this?
The regime has thus retaliated, first by trying to intimidate the demonstrators, then by shooting some of them.
Secondly, it has arrested scores of activists, including former vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi; a former member of parliament Behzad Nabavi and reformist Saeed Hajariian.
A prominent human rights lawyer, Abdolfattah Soltani, was also arrested today in Tehran, the Nobel Peace Prize winner Sherin Ebadi told NPR. She is currently in Switzerland.
And yet, the regime still hopes to avoid a brutal confrontation, for even some of its ardent supporters objected to the heavy handed tactics of the paramilitaries.
Referring to a recent raid on the Tehran University campus, the Speaker of the Iranian parliament, Ali Larijani, said: what’s the meaning of attacking university students at midnight in their dormitory. The interior minister is responsible for this and should answer ( it should be said that Larijani was once Ahmadinejad’s chief nuclear negotiator, but resigned in 2007, after he clashed with the president over the strategy Iran should adopt in its negotiations with the West. In addition, the minister he was attacking, Mr. Mahsouli, is a staunch Ahmadinejad supporter).
In another sign of possible unrest within the establishment, a number of employees of the Interior ministry sent a letter to parliament Speaker Larijani, and to Rasfanjani, chairmen of the Council of Experts:
As dedicated employees of the Ministry of Interior, with experience in management and supervision of several elections such as the elections of Khamenei, Rafsanjani and Khatami, we announce that we fear the 10th presidential elections were not healthy .
As a result, Khamenei has made one concession: he has authorized the Guardian Council (the body that supervises elections) to proceed with a partial recount of certain ballots. Which ones, and how many is not clear. Mousavi has demanded that the election be declared nul and void, and staged anew. The Council has already rejected that option. As such, it is far from certain whether this half measure will satisfy Mousavi’s determined partisans.
What can Mousavi and his supporters do now?
They obviously have little hope of obtaining redress from the institutions, all controlled by Khamenei and the fundamentalists.
Mousavi declared that he was not very optimistic that the Council would rule in his favor. Many of its members during the election were not impartial and supported the government candidate, including the head of the Council, Ahmad Jannati, a staunch supporter of the incumbent…
Furthermore, he has little faith in Khamenei, with whom he clashed in the 1980s when he was prime minister, and the Supreme Leader President.
Nor does he have much regard for his religious credentials…
Indeed, when Khamenei was called to replace Khomeni, he was but a hojatalislam, a junior cleric, and certainly not a ayatollah.
For obvious political reasons, he was quickly promoted to this august rank…
True Islamic scholars therefore, do not consider him one of their own.
That is probably why Mousavi wrote, not to Khamenei, but to the highest clerics in Qom, the most important center of Shia scolarship, requesting that they declare the election null and void.
Bypassing, or, preferably, eliminating Khamenei may be the reformist camp’s only hope of prevailing in this struggle.
Mousavi’s powerful patron Rasfanjani, chairman of the Council of Experts (the 86-member assembly that chooses the Supreme Leader, but can also demote him), is reportedly in Qom, assessing the mood of the Council…Khamenei’s removal would greatly undermine Ahmadinejad, but could also lead to the implosion of the regime itself…Does Mousavi want to got that far?
The brutal struggles continues…How it will be resolved depends exclusively on the Iranian people.
How far are they willing to go to prevail?
An Iranian-American wrote this to the New York Times’ Roger Cohen:
The bottom line right now is whose violence threshold is higher? How much are the hard-liners willing to inflict to suppress the population and tell yet another generation to shut up? And how much are Mousavi and his supporters willing to stand to fulfill their dreams? It sounds so inhuman, but that’s what it comes down to. It’s very scary.
May Mousavi and his supporters have the necessary wisdom and fortitude to be victorious…

(the title of this post, "I wrote Mousavi, you read Ahmadenijad" refers to the fact that each voter had to write in the name of his choice on the ballot; incidentally, to make sure there would be no foul play, many Iranians brought their own pens, in case the ones made available in the polling booths contained disappearing ink...)

(the photograph on top is by Ben curtis/AP)

　
　

A stolen election?

Everyone expected the Iranian presidential election to be a highly contested one, and the momentum, in the final stretch seemed to belong to the challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi.
And yet, when the official results were released, the incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner, with 62.6% of the vote, followed by Mr. Mousavi with 34%.
Voter participation was a historic 85%, meaning that over 46,2 million Iranians went to the polls..
The supporters of the reformist candidate were bitterly disappointed, and suspecting foul play, took to the streets, to vent their fury…There has been some violence, and many arrests…
Who is Mr. Mousavi, and who are his supporters?
To begin with, in Iran, all candidates belong to the same family: they are all followers of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who overthrew the Shah in 1979...All share his islamist ideology and support the theocratic regime put in place thirty years ago…
Those who oppose the ideology and the regime are simply banned from participating in the political life of the nation. All candidates for the presidency and parliament, the Majlis, are vetted by the Guardian Council, and all those not deemed sufficiently islamist or fundamentalist are barred from running.
The choice for the voter thus boils down to choosing a reformist islamist or a conservative one…
Mousavi is backed by the reformist camp consisting in the Islamic left (the original revolutionaries, who, incidentally, occupied the US embassy in 1979), and the forces that supported the moderate Muhammad Khatami, who was president between 1997 and 2005), and the technocratic wing, also known as the modern right (for a detailed study of contemporary Iranian politics, see Walter Posch’s Prospects for Iran’s 2009 Presidential Elections).
The modern right is composed of pro-free market groups, and technocrats who support Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, another former president, and one of the richest men in Iran (and some claim, one of the most corrupt).
Mousavi also attracted the support of those conservative clerics alienated by Ahmadinejad (who is not a cleric), his populist, autocratic style and disregard for some prominent theologians.
More significantly, however, Mousavi has chiefly benefited from being the anti-Ahmadinejad candidate. Though a poor public speaker without much charisma, many women and young Iranians enthusiastically backed his candidacy in the hope that a government led by him would be more tolerant and less oppressive. As prime minister during the 80s and the Iran-Iraq war, he is remembered as having competently managed the economy during a difficult time.
Generally, the fundamentalist, conservative wing of the islamist movement does support Ahmadinejad. His most prominent supporter is the Supreme Leader (who has the final say in all essential foreign, military and security policy matters), Ayatollah Ali Khameni, the successor of Khomeini.
It is equally significant that he has the backing of the principle security forces in Iran, The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (founded in 1979, an elite corps in which Ahmadinejad served in the 80s), and the Basij militia, also founded in 1979. It is an all-volunteer paramilitary group notorious for its role in enforcing the regime’s strict dress and public behavior codes…It has frequently been accused of various human rights violations, including harassing and detaining political opponents.
Yet he has also found support in rural areas, and in the ill-educated urban poor, who appreciate his humble lifestyle, lack of pretense, and the subsidies he disbursed during his first term.
Politically, the two candidates differ more in style than in substance.
Both support the country’s nuclear program, for instance, as do the vast majority of Iranians… A Mousavi foreign policy, however, would be less abrasive, and shun the outrageous. Many in Iran have been deeply embarrassed by Ahmadinejad’s repeated denials of the Holocaust, and his diatribes against the state of Israel…
In addition, it would be easier for the West to negotiate with Moussavi, than having to deal with the unpredictable Ahmadinejad…
So, what did happen? Was the election stolen or was the Green Wave (his young supporters were clad in green) supporting Mousavi not potent enough?
There is ample circumstantial evidence to suggest that the official results do not reflect the actual will of the electorate.
To begin with, according to official results, Ahmadinejad defeated Mousavi, an Azeri, in his home town of Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan province.
Secondly, he also officially defeated him in Tehran, one of Mousavi’s electoral strongholds.
Unlike other elections, the vote results by district were not published.
In addition, 40 different opinion polls recently released all predicted a Mousavi victory (though one issued June 8th, predicted Ahmadinejad would win 34%, and Mousavi 14%, thus forcing a runoff between the two next Friday).
Moshen Makhmalbaf, a filmaker, and campaign spokesman for Moussavi, declared that he had been contacted Friday night by the Interior ministry, and notified that Mousavi had won easily.
Yet, just two hours after the polls closed, Interior minister Sadegh Mahsouli, a staunch Ahmadinejad supporter, released election results indicating an overwhelming victory for the incumbent. Mousavi’s website was then shut down, and all cell communications and text messaging blocked in Tehran.
Furthermore, the Supreme Leader, Khamenei quickly recognized the outcome and congratulated the victor, thereby pre-empting all attempts to dispute the results:
The chosen and respected president is the president of all the Iranian nation and everyone, including yesterday’s competitors, must unanimously support and help him, he declared, even though the Electoral Commission is supposed to officially disclose the results three days after election day, so that all disputes can be examined and resolved…
In any case, demonstrations erupted in Tehran, Mashhal and Baabol .
Universities in Tehran were closed, cell phones and messaging were still unavailable Saturday…
Mehdi Karroubi, another reformist candidate who won little support (just 300,000 votes, according to official tallies) told the New York Times: The results of the 10th presidential election are so ridiculous and so unbelievable that one cannot write or talk about it in a statement.
As for Mr. Moussavi, his whereabouts are unknown.
There are some reports that, along with many other reformists, he has been arrested.
He refused to recognize the results, and has vowed to resist:
The reported results of the 10th Iranians Presidential Election are appalling. The people who witnessed the mixture of votes in long lineups know who they have voted for and observe the wizardry of I.R.I.B (State run TV and Radio) and election officials. Now more than ever before they want to know how and by which officials this game plan has been designed. I object fully to the current procedures and obvious and abundant deviations from law on the day of election and alert people to not surrender to this dangerous plot…We will continue with our green wave of rationality that is inspired by our religious learnings and our love for prophet Mohammad and will confront the rampage of lies that has appeared and marked the image of our nation. However we will not allow our movement to become blind one.
His options are few. If he, or his partisans continue to resist and take to the streets, the regime would no doubt crack down hard, as the security apparatus is firmly in their hands….
Yet, if he does not react, if his innumerable young and female supporters relent and acquiesce, then their hopes of building a more open and tolerant society will be dashed, perhaps for good…

To conclude, one interesting question comes to mind: win or lose, the fundamentalists, with the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council and other key institutions are always, ultimately, in control.
They were able to subvert Khatami's progressive agenda during his two terms in office.
Why would they feel sufficiently threatened, this time, to steal an election? 　
Were they afraid that the Green Wave might lead to another Velvet Revolution?　
　
.