We have learned little from the failed campaigns of the past

Last Monday, in a speech on Afghanistan delivered in West Point, President Obama reaffirmed his conviction that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
As a result, he announced that he would send as quickly as possible an additional 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan to accomplish the mission he defined thus, to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.
In order to do so within the deadline that he set-eighteen months- the military, with its additional resources, will launch a new offensive to halt and reverse the Taliban’s current resurgence.
In addition, the military will also concentrate on training new Afghan recruits so that the Afghan army can operate independently as soon as possible.
It is its capacity to act autonomously that will condition the withdrawal of US and NATO forces.
After the security of the Afghan population has been enhanced by the military surge, improving basic services and the Afghan economy in general will become possible.
The US and its allies will assist those Afghans eager to contribute to the rebuilding of the country, and encourage rank and file Taliban to cease fighting.
Concomitantly, the US seeks to forge a close relationship with Pakistan the aim of which will be to target extremists thriving in that country’s border region with Afghanistan. A significant civilian aid and economic package is also planned to promote stability within Pakistan.
Such was the ambitious plan President Obama exposed to the nation and the world before an audience of cadets and officers at the US Military Academy.
After eight years of meager progress and major setbacks, can this plan turn the situation around in the beleaguered country?
First, we must ask ourselves the following question: do the US and NATO need an additional 30,000 troops to accomplish the mission, that is to say, to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
In fact, there are very few al-Qaeda activists currently operating in Afghanistan, though the Taliban controls 10 to 15% of the country.
According to US officials in Kabul, there are less than 100 in Afghanistan, and some 300 in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
If these figures are correct, then we should be asking ourselves this question: if the renewed presence of the Taliban in some parts of the country has not led to any increase in the number of al-Qaeda operatives there, is a military offensive against the Taliban, one demanding an influx of military resources, the most efficient and cost-effective means to eradicate the remnants of the terrorist organization?
In other words, a resurgence of the Taliban has not led to the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. If that is the case, why should we be launching a new military offensive against them?
This would make sense only if the Taliban and al-Qaeda were essentially one and the same.
Are they?
Though Taliban leader Mullah Omar did shelter al-Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden, provoking the US invasion in 2001, there are indications that relations between the two organizations have soured. Their goals and ambitions are different.
The former seeks to regain power in Kabul, the latter wage holy war against the West.
According to a senior military intelligence official quoted by The Washington Post, if you debrief senior Taliban guys, they'll tell you that al-Qaeda stole the victory, because they were going to win prior to the World Trade Center attacks. The more they connect themselves to al-Qaeda, the less the population's going to welcome them back.
The Taliban was fighting the Northern Alliance led by Ahmad Shah Masood for the control of Afghanistan at the time.
The Taliban are not likely to make the same mistake twice. We assure all countries that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as a responsible force, will not extend its hand to cause jeopardy to others, Omar wrote last September.
In addition, many in Washington share that conclusion, U.S. intelligence officials say they believe there are few, if any, links between Taliban commanders in Afghanistan today and senior al-Qaeda members, wrote Rajiv Chandrasekaran of the WP.
Furthermore, are most insurgents (25,000 at most) fighting the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan even members of the Taliban?
One US intelligence official told the Boston Globe, ninety percent is a tribal, localized insurgency. Ten percent are hardcore ideologues fighting for the Taliban.
They are Pashtun fighters who resent the presence of foreigners in their country, and have fought all those who invaded Afghanistan throughout the centuries.
There is a completely homegrown Pashtun tradition of Jihad, which is different from radical [followers of the Taliban] and goes back centuries. We are just the latest foreign invader, Arturo Munoz, of the Rand Corporation told the Boston Globe.
Matthew Hoh, former Senior Civilian Representative in Zabul Province wrote the following in his letter of resignation, the Pashtun insurgency, which is composed of multiple, seemingly infinite, local groups, is fed by what is perceived by the Pashtun people as a continued and sustained assault, going back centuries, on Pashtun land, culture, traditions and religion by internal and external enemies.
Foreign troops in Afghanistan are already being perceived by more and more Afghans as occupation forces, unable or unwilling to defeat the Taliban and leave. What have the Americans done in eight years? Americans are saying that with their planes they can see an egg 18 kilometers away, so why can’t they see the Taliban?, a pharmacist in Charikar, a town near the capital, told the NYT.
Is it wise to add 30 to 40,000 additional troops in such a context?
In other words, is it not our very presence that is fueling the resistance we hope to crush with an infusion of additional troops?
I have observed that the bulk of the insurgency fights not for the white banner of the Taliban, but rather against the presence of foreign soldiers and taxes imposed by an unrepresentative government in Kabul, concluded Mathew Hoh.
General McChrystal plans to send most of those forces in southern Afghanistan where Pashtuns predominate…
Apart from securing Afghanistan’s major population centers, the military’s mission consists in training an effective national army, and increasing its size from the current 90,000 to 134,000 by October 2010.
This shall be a daunting task, all the more so as eight years of effort have accomplished little…
Last year, 25% of combat soldiers deserted the Afghan army, and the trend is accelerating.
Of those that remained, an additional 19% failed to report for duty.
The focus of the training program has always been ‘more soldiers’ at the expense of quality training. There are no ‘tests.’ A soldier does not have to master any task prior to graduating. Attendance equals graduation, an American trainer told the NYT.
In such a context, increasing the size of the army, without improving the quality of its training and recruitment, if that is indeed possible, will be futile.
Yet, the Afghan army has other major weaknesses as well.
Corruption was big: money, pay, accountability for soldiers, accountability for weapons, accountability for sensitive items, vehicles, fuel, ammunition, an American instructor told the BBC. In the big picture, that's a big problem.
Routinely, Afghan army equipment has been found for sale at local markets.
That is not all.
Nepotism in the army is probably one of the things that hurt them the most. In the long run, that has to be overcome if they are going to take over control of their country, the instructor concluded.
Other major deficiencies are likely to undermine the training effort. Only 10% of Afghan troops can read, and a further 16% are drug addicts.
As such, can we reasonably expect to increase the size of the Afghan army to 134,000 and eventually 240,000? Nothing in our experience over the last seven to eight years suggests that progress at such a rapid pace is realistic, said John Tierney , a Democratic member of the House from Massachusetts and chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform subcommittee on national security.
One of the assessments provided to the Obama administration during its Afghanistan policy review concluded, the most significant challenge to rapidly expanding the Afghan National Security Forces is a lack of competent and professional leadership at all levels, and the inability to generate it rapidly.
Eight years certainly have not been enough…
In its current state, the Afghan army is barely able to function.
Of its 127 units, only 44 are able to operate independently.
Hence, of the current 95,000 troops, 33,000 are operational.
In fact, most, according to Dexter Filkins, of the NYT, are not able to mount operations at night or to operate any weapon more complicated than a rifle.
Last but not least, the army is mainly composed of, and led by Tajiks, who represent 25% of the overall Afghan population. Pashtuns, 42% of the population, account for only 33% of the troops and virtually none come from Helmand and Qandahar provinces, areas dominated by Pashtuns, and the Taliban.
The Afghan police, numbering about 93,000, are in no better condition, and even more corrupt. Afghan police officers say that high-ranking jobs in the force, for instance, are often auctioned off for tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars; the Afghans who secure those jobs then often use their positions to reap even more money by facilitating the movement of narcotics, wrote Dexter Filkins.
Is it realistic to expect General McChrystal to train Afghan security forces so that they are sufficiently proficient in eighteen months to allow President Obama to commence a troop withdrawal?
If, by some miracle, the security situation were to improve, would the Karzai government be in a position to deliver basic services to the Afghan people?
Their needs are immense.
According to UNICEF, Afghanistan is currently the world’s worst place to be born, because it has the highest infant mortality rate, 257 per 1000 births (the rate is 4 in France, and 8 in the US).
70% of the population has no access to clean water.
The deteriorating security situation has had dire consequences.
According to Daniel Toole, UNICEF regional director for South Asia, 43% of the country is inaccessible to relief agencies for security reasons.
Furthermore, the Taliban have been targeting schools, 317 last year, killing 124 people.
As a result, we have seen a drop in the number of children who are attending schools and particularly young girls, Toole said.
Since 2001, billions in civilian aid have been channeled to Afghanistan by the international community ($13 billion by the US alone), yet living conditions are becoming more difficult for most Afghans.
The US State Department has sent over 500 civilian aid workers to Afghanistan this year to help rebuild the ravaged nation. Yet, most remain in Kabul because it is too dangerous to travel anywhere else, right now, the overwhelming majority of civilians are in Kabul, and the overwhelming majority never leave their compounds. Our entire system of delivering aid is broken, and very little of the aid is getting to the Afghan people, Henry Crumpton, an adviser to General McChrystal told the NYT.
For Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the endeavor has been a nightmare; vast amounts have been wasted.
In addition, seven governmental departments did not even manage to spend more than 40% of their allocated budgets last year, due to incompetence and lack of expertise.
Financing of developmental projects actually decreased by 10% …
Corruption is also a major impediment to the development of a functioning, efficient state, and a sound economy.
The President’s own brother is reportedly involved in the drug trade.
I know very high government officials who have heroin storerooms in their own houses, Mohammed Hussein Andewal, a former police chief of Helmand province told
Tom Lasseter of McClatchy Newspapers.
Furthermore, wrote Lasseter, Afghan officials' involvement in the drug trade suggests that American tax dollars are supporting the corrupt officials who protect the Taliban's efforts to raise money from the drug trade, money the militants use to buy weapons that kill U.S. soldiers.
Fifteen current and former government ministers are currently under investigation for corruption.
Among the greatest mistakes of the international community has been its laissez-faire approach to the corruption, cronyism and venality of the Afghan government, Nick Horne, who resigned from the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, wrote last month in The Times.
One member of the Afghan Parliament, Nooruhaq Uloomi, delivered this assessment,
We have to have a better government because all these soldiers will be sent to benefit this corrupt government. This government is corrupt from top to bottom.
In the end, purging the Afghan government of its corruption and fecklessness should prove a Herculean task.
A Defense Department report issued last January concluded, building a fully competent and independent Afghan government will be a lengthy process that will last, at a minimum, decades.
How much cooperation should we expect from Pakistan, even if its government were fully willing and able to support our efforts?
Pakistan has been deeply suspicious of US intentions in the region, and, quite simply, does not trust the US, as Hilary Clinton was vigorously reminded during her visit last October. It knows that one day, the US will withdraw (as it did twenty years ago), and Pakistan will have to deal with its unruly neighbors on its own. Drone attacks on suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders (within Pakistan) infuriate Pakistanis, as many innocent civilians are killed in the process.
At America’s urging, the Pakistan military has been fighting Pakistani Taliban elements in their stronghold of South Waziristan. The extremists have retaliated by waging a terrorist campaign in Pakistan.
Look, Madam Secretary, one Pakistani journalist told Clinton, we are fighting a war that is imposed on us. It's not our war. That was your war, and we are fighting that war. Pakistan’s links with the Taliban (which it sponsored and supported in the 90s in order to ensure that Afghanistan would not be dominated by pro-Indian forces such as the Northern Alliance) have never been severed, at least not with elements of its intelligence agency, the ISI.
Furthermore, they believe the US will try to seize its nuclear arsenal should the government continue to be undermined by homegrown Islamic extremists.
The current government is particularly weak. Last week, President Zardari withdrew from the National Command Authority, the body that controls the nation’s nuclear weapons.
He has been under immense pressure to cede some of the presidential powers his predecessor General Pervez Musharraf had wrested away from parliament during his tenure.
In addition, the amnesty that shielded the notoriously corrupt Zardari, husband of assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, also known as Mr. 10%, from corruption charges expired last Saturday…He is therefore particularly vulnerable at this time.
In such a context, can he openly embrace US objectives for the region, and help Obama thwart Islamic extremism? Can he do so and survive politically?
That is highly improbable.
In any case, it is the Pakistani military that will have the last word, most probably.
For Pakistan to cooperate, President Obama will need to convince the Pakistan people that his intentions are pure, and that the relationship is about much more than just terrorism. This should take some doing…
Can President Obama’s new strategy achieve the results that have eluded us for the last eight years?
Alas, that is highly unlikely.
If we do not succeed, what shall we do then, in 2011?
If the situation continues to deteriorate, albeit slowly, what options shall be left?
Our cause is just, our resolve unwavering, the President eloquently stated in his speech.
And yet…
Surely, the President knows that in eighteen months, not much can change for the better. If we are fortunate, the situation will cease deteriorating, but as he himself said, the status quo is not sustainable.
As such, is the President challenging the COIN advocates to deliver, and deliver quickly or else?
Is he not giving counterinsurgency (I am baffled by the fad of counterinsurgency, and I'm especially baffled by the extent to which the American officer corps has embraced this fad, Andrew Bacevich, professor of international relations and history at Boston University, said on PBS’ Frontline) one last try to either deliver or fail, before he moves in another more realistic direction, in order to shield himself from criticism, and avoid the standard cut-and-run accusation, and adopts Vice President Biden’s counter terrorism approach?
History shows that occupation by foreign armies with the intent of changing occupied societies does not work and ends up costing considerable blood and treasure.
The notion that if only an army gets a few more troops, with different and better generals, then within a few years it can defeat a multi-faceted insurgency set in the middle of civil war, is not supported by an honest reading of history, wrote Gian P. Gentile, a U.S. Army Colonel who heads the Military History Program at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He served in Iraq in 2003 and 2006.
The wiser course, the more realistic one, is also the most humble: withdrawal.
Perhaps that is why it is not popular in Washington and other Western capitals.
I fear that we are undertaking an escalation that, yet again, others will pay for, and in blood: our troops (since all are professional soldiers, we civilians are spared, and not even asked to pay for the war; the government simply borrows to finance it), and the hapless Afghans who have seen enough of their own die needlessly these last thirty years.
Obama’s surge will cost an additional $30 billion and most likely fail.
Could we not use these funds more constructively to achieve our goal of destroying al-Qaeda, and helping the Afghan and Pakistan peoples lead decent lives?
Our soldiers are not to blame. They’ve fought incredibly bravely in adverse conditions. But to occupy towns and villages temporarily has little value in such a vast land where the insurgents can just disappear into the hills. Without them (extra troops and equipment), without a lot more men, this war will continue for a very, very long time…
About 99 percent of the battles and skirmishes that we fought in Afghanistan were won by our side. The problem is that the next morning there is the same situation as if there had been no battle. The terrorists are again in the village where they were — or we thought they were — destroyed a day or so before.
These words were spoken by Marshal Akhromeyev, Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces, in 1986. We could be saying them today…
It is distressing to discover that we have learned so little from the failed campaigns of the past…
The Soviets withdrew three years later, in February 1989, some ten years after the December 1979 invasion.
15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, as well as some 800,000 Afghans.
We have been there for eight years…
It is time to leave, and let the Afghans decide what is best for Afghanistan…
We can take care of what is left of al-Qaeda with a few thousand Special Forces along the border. Moreover, if worst comes to worst, the 2001 campaign aptly demonstrated that we can easily rout the Taliban and overthrow the government if need be.
They know that as well…
It is for the Afghans, all the Afghans to forge a modus vivendi.
We cannot do that for them, and they will have to do so, sooner or later.
Let us devote our time and our billions to improving the lives of the Afghans and Pakistanis (and modernizing our own nations).
They need our help, and our expertise, not our Marines and Foreign Legionnaires….
(the photograph can be found here)